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CREATION AND TEMPORALITY IN 
MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 
T. M. Rudavsky 
Of the many philosophical perplexities facing medieval Jewish thinkers, 
perhaps none has been as challenging or as divisive as determining whether 
the universe is created or eternal. Not unlike contemporary cosmologists 
who worry about the first instant of creation of the universe, or Christian 
scholastics who attempted to define the nature of an instant, so too 
medieval Jewish thinkers were aware of the philosophical complexities sur-
rounding the issues of creation and time. Jews were immensely affected by 
Scripture and in particular by the creation account found in Genesis I-IT. In 
the context of this tension, perhaps the most important word of Scripture is 
b'reishit, "in the beginning." The very term b'reishit designates the fact that 
there was a beginning, i.e., temporality has been introduced if only in the 
weakest sense that this creative act occupies a period of time. In this paper 
I shall focus my study upon Jewish philosophical attempts to clarify what is 
entailed by postulating a first instant of creation. I shall begin with early 
Rabbinical commentaries upon Genesis, and then turn to three paradigmatic 
medieval Jewish thinkers who, influenced by these Rabbinical texts, repre-
sent the range of positions taken with respect to this issue. 
1. Introduction 
Of the many philosophical perplexities facing medieval Jewish thinkers, 
perhaps none has been as challenging or as divisive as determining 
whether the universe is created or eternal. Not unlike contemporary cos-
mologists who worry about the first instant of creation of the universe, or 
Christian scholastics who attempted to define the nature of an instant, so 
too medieval Jewish thinkers were aware of the philosophical complexities 
surrounding the issues of creation and time. No Jewish philosopher 
denied the centrality of the doctrine of creation to Jewish dogma. Jews 
were immensely affected by Scripture and in particular by the creation 
account found in Genesis I-II. But like their Christian and Moslem peers, 
Jewish thinkers did not always agree upon what qualifies as an acceptable 
model of creation. In particular, medieval Jewish philosophers writing on 
creation were influenced by Aristotle's model of an eternally existing 
world. When trying to prove that the world was created by God in time, 
philosophers who wanted to support a biblical theory of creation in time 
had to reject Aristotle's position that time is infinite. For if, as Aristotle 
claimed, time is the measure of motion, and motion is of material stuff, 
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then infinite time implies the eternity of the universe. But inasmuch as 
accepting the eternity of the universe qualifies the role God plays in deter-
mining the act and materials of creation, Jewish thinkers were motivated to 
reject the Aristotelian characterization of time while at the same time con-
tinuing to accept his overall philosophical authority. 
In the context of this tension, perhaps the most important word of 
Scripture is b'reishit, "in the beginning". The very term b'reishit designates 
the fact that there was a beginning, i.e. temporality has been introduced if 
only in the weakest sense that this creative act occupies a period of time.1 
In this paper I shall focus my study upon Jewish philosophical attempts to 
clarify what is entailed by postulating a first instant of creation. I shall 
begin with early Rabbinical commentaries upon Genesis, and then turn to 
three paradigmatic medieval Jewish thinkers who, influenced by these 
Rabbinical texts, represent the range of positions taken with respect to this 
issue. 
II. Rabbinical Reflections upon Creation 
Not surprisingly, early Rabbinical texts evince earnest grappling with 
the scriptural account of creation. Rabbinical sayings find their way into 
the philosophical corpus early on. Although the Rabbis were not technical-
ly philosophers, they nevertheless raised many questions which were 
incorporated into philosophical discussions.2 One question addressed by 
the earliest commentators was whether the universe was created ex nihilo 
or out of a pre-existent reality. That the first statement in Genesis could be 
read to support a theory of pre-existent formless matter was recognized 
early on by the Rabbis. 3 According to one Rabbinical dictum the word 
b'reishit refers to the fact that before the actual creation there pre-existed a 
number of things. Numerous Rabbinical texts suggest that the presently 
existing world came into being after a series of worlds that had been creat-
ed and destroyed: 4 
1.1 Seven things were created before the world, viz. the Torah, 
repentance, the Garden of Eden, Gehenna, the Throne of Glory, the 
Temple, and the name of the Messiah.' 
1.2 Six things came before the creation of the world, some created, 
some at least considered as candidates for creation ... " 
1.3 He has come to receive the Torah, answered He to them. Said 
they to Him: 'That secret treasure, which has been hidden by Thee 
for nine hundred and seventy-four generations before the world was 
created. 17 
1.4 It is taught: R. Simeon the Pious said: These are the nine hundred 
and seventy four generations who pressed themselves forward to be 
created before the world was created, but were not created.' 
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The Rabbis clearly had no religious compunctions against suggesting 
that our world did not represent the first creative effort on the part of God; 
rather, they emphasized that entire worlds or generations pre-existed the 
creation of the universe. This interpretation would explain the emptiness 
and void (tohu va-vohu) which appeared to exist already when God initiat-
ed its original creative act. Rashi, for example, along with many other 
Rabbis, interpreted the first two sentences of Genesis as meaning that 
"when God created the heavens and earth, the earth was (already) empty 
and void (tohu va-vohu), and darkness (hoshekh) was upon the face of the 
deep."9 The explicit implication of this reading is that God created the uni-
verse out of a pre-existing tohu, vohu and hoshekh. This pre-existent stuff 
was the result of at least one prior world. 
With the postulation of pre-existent materials of creation, these texts 
therefore raise the difficult and tantalizing question of whether time itself 
pre-existed creation. In the following passage, it is suggested that time 
could have existed before the existence of the universe: "Said R. Tanhuma, 
The world was created at the proper time. The world was not ready to be 
created prior to this time.'''lo One way to understand the phrase "prior to 
this time" is to posit the eternity of time. That is, introducing a temporal 
indicator to talk about the time when the world was created itself suggests 
that time antedated creation. But other Rabbis claim that time was created: 
"Rab Judah further said that Rab said: 'Ten things were created the first 
day, and they are as follows: heaven and earth, Tohu, Bohu, light and 
darkness, wind and water, the measure of day and the measure of 
night.'''1l Inasmuch as light and darkness, and the measure of day and 
night represent temporal markers, they come to represent, on the basis of 
this passage, the creation of time. 
The similarity of these passages to Plato's Timaeus is striking and did not 
go unnoticed by later Jewish thinkers. In fact, as we shall see, medieval 
Jewish philosophers were able to capitalize upon these similarities in order 
to emphasize the harmonization of Scripture and Greek philosophy. Like 
the Rabbis, Plato too worried whether the existence of the universe at a 
time implied the creation of time itself. Within the panoply of ancient 
Greek cosmologists, Plato is the first to identify time with the movement of 
the heavens. In his cosmological text the Timaeus Plato defines time as "an 
eternal likeness moving according to number - that to which we have 
given the name Time."12 This everlasting likeness is of the Living Being 
which is itself eternal. To this Living Being Plato attributes the domain of 
"is", while "was" and "shall be" are "forms of Time that have come to 
be."B With respect to the thorny question of whether time was created 
along with the heavens or whether it pre-existed creation, Plato offers mul-
tiple responses, which have led scholars to postulate multiple interpreta-
tions of the text.' I For example in 38B Plato clearly suggests that time has 
come into being with the heavens. Other passages, however, suggest that 
time already existed prior to the creation of the heavens, giving rise to the 
notion of a primordial disorderly time. It is not clear, therefore, whether 
Plato ultimately adhered to one or two types of time. What is clear, 
though, is that created time measures the circular motion of the heavenly 
spheres. The sun, moon, and planets were "made to define and preserve 
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the numbers of Time."15 The periods of time - the day, month and year-
are the basic units of measurement which cannot exist without the motions 
of the celestial bodies, the heavenly clock as it were. Neither time nor the 
celestial bodies can exist without the other. 
What we have then is a striking confluence of themes in both the 
Timaeus and in Genesis. Both texts postulate the existence of a creator. Both 
impute to this creator the urge to create, the willful choosing to bring the 
universe into existence. Both recognize the importance of temporality in 
this creation process: the scriptural author(s) by focusing on the impor-
tance of the term "day"(yom) in the creation account, and Plato by intro-
ducing time as the ontological divide between the superlunar and sublunar 
spheres. And finally, both accounts allow for the possibility of creation 
occurring out of a "pre-existent matter," a chaotic, formless stuff upon 
which order is imposed.16 These similarities will playa crucial role in sub-
sequent Jewish discussions of creation, for they allow thinkers such as 
Albo, and possibly even Maimonides, to reconcile a scriptural account of 
creation with a philosophically minded account without undermining their 
religious presuppositions. 
III. The First Instant of Creation 
We see, then, that the early Rabbis were aware of many issues sur-
rounding creation, including the creation or eternity of time itself. These 
issues are reiterated throughout Jewish medieval philosophical literature. 
In part because of the introduction of Greek and Arabic texts, medieval 
works reveal a marked increase in interest in cosmology in general. 
Scholars have been careful to distinguish philosophical cosmology, which 
includes discussion of creation, from astronomy. Comprised primarily of 
natural philosophers and physicists, cosmologists followed Aristotle rather 
than Ptolemy in their quest to offer a theory of the universe as an ordered 
whole.17 The formative classical texts included Aristotle's De Caelo ,supple-
mented by relevant passages from the Metaphysics, Physics and De 
Generatione et Corruptione. Both Plato's Timaeus as well as commentaries 
upon Genesis presented an additional dimension to this corpus. 
Jewish texts in the early ninth - twelfth centuries reflect a strong 
Neoplatonic influence. In addition, the Islamic school known as Kalam per-
meated Jewish philosophical writing. By the time of Maimonides in the 
twelfth century, Jewish philosophers have to a large extent adopted an 
Aristotelian framework according to which reality is a continuous plenum 
in which time and matter are infinitely divisible. More specifically, 
Aristotle posits an eternal universe in which time is potentially, if not actu-
ally, infinite; neither time nor the universe was created. Jewish philoso-
phers, however, who almost without exception are committed to the belief 
that God created the universe, must grapple with the implications of 
Aristotle's eternity thesis with respect to Scriptural theories of creation. For 
example, in light of the first verses of Genesis, they must determine whether 
this universe was created simultaneous with or subsequent to the creation 
of time. Furthermore, they must analyze the significance of the term 
b'reishit in the context of an Aristotelian theory of time. The writings of 
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Saadiah Gaon, Maimonides and Joseph Albo, to which we now turn, attest 
to this tension. 
Writing in tenth century Egypt (882-942), Saadiah Gaon incorporated 
Kalam influences into his major philosophical work Emunot ve-Deot (The 
Book of Doctrines and Beliefs).lB The ostensible purpose of this work is to 
show that the truths of scientific inquiry can be reconciled with the tradi-
tion of Torah; to this end he examines a series of philosophical conundra, 
many of which are drawn from Kalam writings. In the chapter on creation 
Saadiah presents eight arguments for the creation of the world which can 
be divided into two groups of four arguments each: the first group proves 
that the world must be finite (i.e. not eternal), and the second group that 
the world was created ex nihilo and not out of a pre-existent matter. 
Although Saadiah does not mention John Philoponus by name, it is 
clear that he draws from John Philoponus' argument that the infinite can-
not be traversed.19 Jolm Philoponus' major work Contra Aristotelem has 
been lost and survives only in quotations from Simplicius' commentaries 
on Aristotle's De Caelo and Physics.20 In this work, Philoponus hopes to 
demonstrate the creation of the world by arguing that Aristotle's assump-
tion of eternal motion leads to impossible implications. Philoponus' works 
were known to Arabic philosophers, and were transmitted by the Kalam 
school, through Saadiah Gaon, to eleventh and twelfth century Jewish and 
Christian philosophers.21 For this reason his arguments are of crucial 
importance to later medieval attempts to refute Aristotle's arguments for 
the eternity of the universe. 
In his arguments, Philoponus takes Aristotle's definition of the infinite 
(which Aristotle used to prove eternity) and turns it against itself, showing 
that in fact it precludes eternity. The three specific arguments offered by 
Philoponus can be summarized briefly as follows: 
2.1. If the universe were eternal, the generation of any object in the 
sub lunar universe would be preceded by an infinite series of genera-
tion. But an infinite cannot be traversed, and so no objects would be 
generated. 
2.2. The eternity of the universe would imply an infinite number of 
past motions that is continually being increased. But an infinite can-
not be added to. 
2.3. The numbers of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are multi-
ples of one another and thus eternity would imply infinite numbers 
of past motions in varying multiplicities. But infinite numbers can-
not be multiplied. 22 
In Contra Aristotelem Philoponus presents two sets of arguments in sup-
port of creation, both of which are directed against Aristotle's eternity the-
sis. According to Simplicius he assumes as axiomatic that "it is impossible 
for an infinite number to exist in actuality or for anyone to traverse the infi-
nite in counting and that it is also impossible that anything should be 
greater than the infinite, or that the infinite should be increased."21 From 
this axiom he argues as follows. Imagine an infinite series of transforma-
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tions which has taken place among the four elements. In an eternal world, 
these transformations would constitute an infinite series. But, using 
Aristotle's characterization of infinity, it is clear than an infinite number 
cannot exist actually or be traversed. So in an eternal world, the infinite 
series of transformations could never be completed and the particle now 
known to exist could never in fact have come into existence. "If then, the 
motion of the particular fire came to be, an infinite number of motions 
surely did not exist first."24 Further, imagine that the scenario were 
expanded to the spheres. If the motion of the heavens is without a begin-
ning, and if spheres revolve at unequal periods of revolution, then it is nec-
essary that the sphere of Saturn has rotated with an infinite number of rev-
olutions; but on this celestial model the sphere of Jupiter must have rotated 
with nearly three times more revolutions, the sun with thirty times more 
revolutions than Saturn, and that of the fixed stars more than ten thousand 
times greater. But, Philoponus, argues, "if it is not <even> possible to tra-
verse the infinite once, is it not beyond all absurdity to assume ten thou-
sand times the infinite, or rather the infinite an infinite number of times?"25 
Hence he concludes that the circular motion of the heavens is not eternal 
but must have had a beginning. 
Now whether Philoponus' insights can be upheld as philosophically 
cogent in light of modern understandings of infinity (not to speak of helio-
centrism itself) is doubtful. As Sorabji has argued, Philoponus has not 
demonstrably shown that the universe must have had a beginning. In fact, 
it is unlikely that this thesis can ever be supported with the absolute cer-
tainty required by Aristotelian demonstration.26 But I agree with Sorabji 
that the importance of Philoponus' arguments lie in their providing 
medieval Jewish and Christian philosophers with the ammunition they so 
desperately needed to refute the eternity thesis.27 It is precisely this ammu-
nition which Saadiah utilizes in his support of creation ex nihilo. 
Saadiah Gaon's fourth proof of creation "from time" draws upon John 
Philoponus' first proof of creation and is based on Philoponus' premise 
(2.1) that no infinite can be traversed. The argument proceeds as follows: 
3.1 We know that time is threefold: past, present, and future. 
3.2 Although the present is shorter than any instant, let us take the 
instant as one takes a point. 
3.3 By (2.1) above, we know that it is not possible to traverse the infi-
nite. 
3.4 If we assume that time is infinite, it is "impossible for thought to 
penetrate to the furthest point of that which is infinite." 
3.5 Hence if an individual should try in his thought to ascend from 
that present point in time to the "uppermost points", it would be 
impossible for him to do so. 
3.6 On the same reasoning it is impossible that the process of genera-
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tion should traverse an infinite period down to the lowest point so as 
ultimately to reach us. 
3.7 But if the process of generation did not reach us, we would not be 
generated, and the beings now existent would not be existent. 
3.8 However I find myself existent. 
3.9 I therefore know that the process of generation has traversed time 
until it has reached me. 
3.10 We therefore conclude that time must be finite.28 
Having argued that (3.9)-proof of the traversal of past time-supports 
his postulating the finitude of time, Saadiah then applies the argument to 
the traversal of future time as well. But he fully recognizes that (3.3) need 
further examination. It is in the context of supporting (3.3) that Saadiah 
raises a possible objection to the argument. Saadiah attributes to an anony-
mous heretic a variation of Zeno's celebrated paradoxes of motion:29 
3.11 The following objection has been made by "a certain heretic in 
conversation with one of the Believers in the Unity of God." 
3.12 We know that any distance which an individual walks can be 
"divided into an infinite number of parts." 
3.13 But we also know that an individual can in fact cover the dis-
tance between these two points. 
3.14 Therefore it is possible to traverse an infinite distance.3D 
In Saadiah's statement of Zeno's paradox, the heretic claims that inas-
much as any distance is infinitely divisible, the fact that a person can travel 
from one point to another demonstrates that the infinite can be traversed. 
In other words, (3.14) contravenes (2.1) and hence (3.3) must be rejected. 
How, then, can Saadiah account for (3.14), traversing an infinite distance, 
without abandoning his argument for the finitude of time? Aristotle's orig-
inal solution was that the individual has an infinite amount of time in 
which to traverse the infinitely divisible distance in question. Saadiah, 
however, is more interested in Kalam solutions to the problem according to 
which one might apply the notion of the leap, or atomism. The Kalam 
philosopher al-Nazzam, for example, introduced the notion of the leap as a 
response to Zeno.31 Believing in infinite divisibility, but eschewing atom-
ism, he adopted the idea of infinitely divisible leaps in order to explain 
how we can traverse an infinity of sub-distances. On this theory any jour-
ney involves a finite number of variably short leaps.32 
Rejecting this Kalam theory as untenable, Saadiah proposes his own 
solution which is a reflection of Aristotle's distinction between actual and 
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potential infinity. According to Aristotle, Zeno had confused two senses of 
indivisibility: a complete divided state as opposed to the process itself of 
dividing. The first Aristotle terms actual infinity, and the latter he terms 
potential infinity. Aristotle then argues that a solution to Zeno's paradoxes 
relies upon this latter sense of infinity: because infinite divisibility is a con-
tinuing process, the potency in question is thus actualized whenever the 
process is in effect.33 This distinction between actual and potential infinity, 
mediated through the works of John Philoponus, is reflected in Saadiah's 
discussion?' Saadiah argues that Zeno's paradox is sophistical in that it 
fails to note that lithe infinite divisibility of a thing is only a matter of imag-
ination (mahshavah), but not a matter of reality (po' al)."35 If, Saadiah argues, 
the infinite traversal had occurred in the past in the imagination alone, the 
paradox would be valid. But since the process of generation has traversed 
real time and reached us, (3.12) "cannot invalidate our proof, because infi-
nite divisibility exists only in the imagination."36 In answer to this paradox, 
then, Saadiah distinguishes between actual and potential traversal. 
Traversing a finite spatial distance is not the same as traversing infinity, 
because in this case there is no actual infinity, but only an infinitely divisi-
ble finite distance. That is, reminiscent of Aristotle's distinction, Saadiah's 
point is that the infinite exists potentially and not actually. 
Aristotle had shown that a spatial magnitude is potentially infinite by 
division, meaning that it can be divided infinitely not in actuality but in 
potentiality; so too are number and time potentially infinite by addition, 
meaning that units of number and time can be infinitely added to a numer-
ical or temporal sequence, not in actuality but in potentiality. For Aristotle 
this category of potential existence, as expressed by potential infinity 
(either by way of addition or division), is critical to his positing the eternity 
of the universe.37 Saadiah accepts the Aristotelian idea of a potentially infi-
nite divisibility but minimizes its significance. 3R The key to John 
Philoponus' argument was that the infinite cannot be traversed and the 
same is true in Saadiah's argument. But as Davidson points out, 
Philoponus and Saadiah differ on one important point. Philoponus was 
determined to provide a beginning instant not only for the sublunar realm 
but for the celestial domain as well; his denial of an infinite series of trans-
formations on the sublunar realm had to apply equally to the celestial 
realm in which transformations do not occur. Saadiah, on the other hand, 
did not distinguish so sharply between the sublunar and celestial domains 
and so was able to concentrate upon a simpler consideration of traversal of 
a temporal series.39 For Philoponus, therefore, the infinite refers to an infi-
nite series of discrete units, whereas the infinite for Saadiah is construed as 
an infinite time continuum which is not reducible to discrete parts. This 
move simplifies the argument considerably for Saadiah. 
But did Saadiah even recognize the difference between an infinite series 
and infinite continuum? Evidently not, for otherwise he would not have 
moved so seamlessly between time and space. As Davidson points out, 
Saadiah's response to this paradox is that the objection misleadingly 
adduces the traversing not of an 'actually' existing infinite, but of an infi-
nite existing solely in 'imagination', whereas the actual proof relies on the 
fact that an actual infinite cannot be traversed.") That is, the objection 
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views distance not as an infinite continuum, but rather as an infinite series 
of discrete parts. By accepting the cogency of the objection, apparently 
Saadiah did not detect any distinction between the two:' For Saadiah, 
then, Philoponus' arguments pertaining to traversing an infinite distance 
enabled him to support the creation thesis in a way which accorded with 
Scripture. 
Similar considerations occur in the thought of Moses Maimonides (1135-
1204), whose philosophical writings, especially The Guide of the Perplexed, 
represent some of the most far-reaching and influential Jewish philosophi-
cal work to this very day."2 Maimonides is unequivocal with respect to the 
purpose of the Guide, namely to dispel the perplexity of that individual 
who, steeped in the fundamentals of his religious system, nevertheless has 
encountered philosophical precepts which threaten to undermine his reli-
gious beliefs. The reconciliation of rational speCUlation and religious belief, 
philosophy and religion, comes to be the desideratum of this work. Of the 
many topics which demand reconciliation, the doctrine of creation is possi-
bly the most intractable. To deny the creation of the universe on the part of 
the Deity threatens the entire fabric of Jewish belief, including belief in mir-
acles, divine providence, and human freedom; on the other hand, to sub-
scribe to the standardly accepted Jewish view of creation in time threatens 
belief in the scientific underpinnings of reality represented by Aristotle's 
corpus. Maimonides' analysis of creation and its relevance to cosmology 
occurs in two works, in Mishneh Torah III-IV and Guide 1:72 and 11:19-24. 
These two sets of texts present what recent scholars have considered to be 
conflicting cosmological accounts. Unraveling the source of conflict in 
these texts will enable us to determine more fully Maimonides' theory of 
creation. 
The Mishneh Torah is a compilation of the entire oral law, including both 
the Mishnah and the Talmud, and is intended for a general, non-philosophi-
cal audience.43 In this work Maimonides offers a description of the uni-
verse which captures elements of the current Ptolemaic cosmology: the 
spheres are organized in an orderly fashion, with no vacuum obtaining 
between spheres; epicycles are introduced to account for variation in revo-
lution; and spheres are endowed with intelligible souls responsible for 
their orderly motion."' And yet, what complicates matters is that 
Maimonides offers a decidedly anti-Ptolemaic account in the Guide which 
appears incompatible with the Mishneh Torah account. The question, then, 
is whether Maimonides believes that the presentation given in the Mishneh 
Torah or in the Guide more accurately reflects a true account of the origin 
and nature of the universe. 
Because the account presented in the Guide follows Aristotle's philo-
sophical cosmology more closely than that of Ptolemy, I shall briefly sum-
marize the relevant features of this cosmology. In the Aristotelian cosmol-
ogy, the universe is a finite sphere whose center is at the earth. Nine pri-
mary concentric spheres (in turn divided into subsidiary spheres) rotate 
around the earth; these spheres form a compact whole with no vacuum. 
The superlunar heavens differ in composition from the sublunar bodies in 
that the former are composed of a single incorruptible element, aether, 
while the earth is comprised of the four elements. The ultimate source of 
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motion in this system is God, or the unmoved first mover:5 But did God 
move the first moving sphere as an active, efficient cause, or as a passive, 
final cause? In attributing to all the celestial spheres a mover, the ultimate 
source of motion being God, Aristotle subsequently argued that there 
must be a plurality of spheres to account for the motion of each planet. In 
speculating upon the motion of the spheres, Aristotle reflects the Platonic 
view that time is inherent in the cyclical movement of the celestial spheres. 
If this movement of the spheres did not exist, there would be no time. 
Aristotle claims in a number of texts that time is defined in terms of motion 
and so there can be no time without motion.46 On Aristotle's model, then, 
there was a series of concentric nested orbs, each moving in a nahlral, uni-
form, circular motion, all sharing the earth as a common center.47 
In Guide 1.72 Maimonides presents a cosmological scheme which, while 
reflecting basic features of Aristotle's account, nevertheless shares as well 
some affinities with the Ptolemaic picture found in Mishneh Torah. This 
cosmological picture is then amplified in Guide 11:19-24. Maimonides 
argues, following Aristotle, that both the matter and the form of the 
spheres differ from that of the four elements, as reflected in the different 
types of motion exhibited by them. But he then points to several problems 
with Aristotle's attempts to explain why the sphere moves from the East 
and not from the West, and why some spheres move faster than others. 
Maimonides rejects Aristotle's explanations on the grounds that "the sci-
ence of astronomy was not in his [Aristotle's] time what it is today."48 
Having rejected Aristotle's analysis, Maimonides presents his own ver-
sion in Guide 11.24. His main thesis is that the underlying premise of 
Ptolemy'S Almagest, namely that "everything depends on two principles; 
either that of the epicycles or that of the eccentric spheres or on both of 
them,"49 is untenable. Maimonides' own contention is that these two prin-
ciples are "entirely outside the bounds of reasoning and opposed to all that 
has been made clear in natural science."sn In other words, Maimonides 
rejects Ptolemaic astronomy on the grounds that it conflicts with 
Aristotelian physics. The first principle is rejected on the grounds that the 
existence of epicycles implies that that the "epicycle rolls and changes its 
place completely," hence undermining the Aristotelian dictum that things 
in the heavens are immovable.51 He then offers other considerations, in the 
name of Abu Bakr, against accepting the doctrine of epicycles.52 
Following this analysis, Maimonides presents the following theoretical 
perplexity: 
If what Aristotle has stated with regard to natural science is true, 
there are no epicycles or eccentric circles and everything revolves 
round the center of the earth. But in that case how can the various 
motions of the stars come about? Is it in any way possible that 
motion should be on the one hand circular, uniform, and perfect, and 
that on the other hand the things that are observable should be 
observed in consequence of it, unless this be accounted for by making 
use of one of the two principles, or of both of them? This considera-
tion is all the stronger because of the fact that if one accepts every-
thing stated by Ptolemy concerning the epicycle of the moon and its 
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deviation toward a point outside the center of the world and also out-
side the center of the eccentric circle, it will be found that what is cal-
culated on the hypothesis of the two principles is not at fault by even 
a minute .. This is the true perplexity.53 
That Maimonides characterizes an astronomical conundrum as the "true 
perplexity" in a work whose raison d'etre is devoted to defusing perplexi-
ties has not escaped scholars.54 Does Maimonides really mean to suggest 
that the perplexities engendered by a religious individual who is intro-
duced to philosophy are crystallized by difficulties pertaining to astrono-
my? Maimonides responds to this perplexity by defining the function of 
the astronomer in a way which suggests that in his view the heavens can-
not ultimately be configured by humans.55 But the underlying implication 
of the Mishneh Torah is that the heavens can be configured; in fact we saw 
that Maimonides himself gave such a configuration. If the Mishneh Torah 
represents the absolute codification of physical and metaphysical truth, 
what do we make of his account in the Guide?56 In answer to this question, 
Kellner for one has argued that the Mishneh Torah "does not represent the 
most perfect possible exposition of that science available to him and most 
certainly does not represent the highest stage that astronomy can reach."57 
On this reading the Mishneh Torah represents the conventional Ptolemaic 
wisdom of the time, as contrasted with the anti-Ptolemaic account given in 
the Guide. 
But underlying this query lies a deeper concern, namely whether 
Maimonides really believes that the heavens can be configured. The 
description provided in Mishneh Torah would imply that human beings 
can have the sort of astronomical sophistication required to achieve knowl-
edge of the celestial order; on the other hand, several key passages appear 
to undercut these implications. If it is not possible to achieve such knowl-
edge, what does that say about our understanding of creation itself? 
My own reading is an amplification of Langermann's point that, in con-
tradistinction to implicit suggestions in 11.24, Maimonides does regard the 
true configuration of the heavens as something humanly attainable.58 On 
this reading, Maimonides' point is epistemological rather than ontological: 
it is not that the heavenly spheres are per se inaccessible to the human intel-
lect, but rather that nobody yet has determined their true configuration. 59 
The key passages for this interpretation are (4.1) and (4.2), both of which 
emphasize the epistemological, not the ontological, limits of human intel-
lect: 
4.1. To fatigue the mind with matters that "cannot be grasped by 
them" is a defect in one's inborn disposition. 
4.2. It is possible that somebody else may "find a demonstration by 
means of which the true reality of what is obscure for me will become 
clear to him."60 
(4.1) warns against pushing human intellect beyond its dispositional 
limits; and (4.2) suggests that it is not inconceivable that some mind may 
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find a demonstration of these matters. In other words, there is nothing in 
the nature of the heavenly configurations per se which precludes their 
being known. That is, there is nothing in the science of astronomy which is 
per se beyond human grasp. 
If that is so, the relevant implications to Maimonides' theory of creation 
are clear. Already in his Introduction to the Guide, Maimonides had listed 
the doctrine of creation as a subject so dangerous that it should be dis-
cussed only within the company of one individual. Maimonides' own dis-
cussion of creation is intentionally fraught with ambiguity and equivocity. 
As a result, interpretation of these chapters has become among the most 
hotly contested enterprise in recent Maimonidean studies. Scholarly read-
ings have ranged from regarding Maimonides as a pious follower of 
Jewish belief, to a closet heretic adhering to Aristotelian eternity, to a skep-
tic whose true view espouses the inherent limitations imposed upon the 
human intellect in these matters. 
In other papers I have argued that one key to reading Maimonides' 
views on creation lies in his theory of time.61 Without going into the details 
of this argument, suffice it to say here that in Guide II, in the context of his 
discussion of creation, Maimonides argues that "God's bringing the world 
into existence does not have a temporal beginning, for time is one of the 
created things."62 Maimonides does not want to suggest that time itself is 
eternal, for "if you affirm as true the existence of time prior to the world, 
you are necessarily bound to believe in the eternity [of the world]."63 But 
neither will he claim that the creation of the world is a temporally specifi-
able action, for the world, on the Aristotelian definition of time, must be 
beginningless in the sense that it has no temporal beginning. Clearly then 
the temporal specificity of creation plays a critical role in Maimonides' the-
ory. 
This last point is emphasized in Maimonides' commentary on the word 
b'reishit. What does Scripture mean by saying that "In the beginning God 
created ... "? In order to explain the sense of beginning' being used in this 
context, Maimonides turns in Guide II.30 to an interpretation of the two 
terms tehilah and reishit, both of which mean "start" or 'beginning". As 
Klein-Braslavy has pointed out, Maimonides distinguishes between the 
two on the basis of causal priority.64 While the term tehilah implies causal 
beginning, the term reishit refers not to a temporal priority of one event to 
another, but rather to its ontological genesis. o5 In other words, temporal 
anteriority is not the same as causal anteriority. On this basis Maimonides 
is able to allow for an interpretation of the word b'reishit in such a way as 
to accord with eternal creation. The b' prefix in the word b'reishit is not, on 
this reading, a temporal indicator, but rather fixes the event in question 
ontologically: it refers not to a temporal beginning but to an underlying 
ontological state; So that when we read the phrase in Genesis I.l ("b'reishit 
barah elohim" = "in the beginning God created"), we should understand it 
to describe a nontemporal event, one which specifies that God is the cre-
ator of the universe, that is, its ontological ground of Being. 
How then does Maimonides interpret those rabbis who understood the 
Creation account in Genesis to postulate a domain of temporality before the 
creation event? For example, how there can be 'one day', at the beginning 
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of creation, when the temporal indicators, i.e. sun and moon, were not cre-
ated until the fourth day? In II.30 Maimonides quotes two Rabbinic 
authorities, Judah ben Simon and Abahu, both of whom suggest that "time 
existed prior to the existence of this sun."66 Recognizing that their state-
ments support an eternity thesis, Maimonides adopts two separate strate-
gies. The first is simply to admit that their comments imply that "the order 
of time necessarily exists eternally a parte ante. That, however, is the belief 
in the eternity a parte ante of the world, and all who adhere to the Law 
should reject it."67 Maimonides' second strategy is to subsume their com-
ments as corollaries of those of Rabbi Eliezer. In 11.13 Maimonides refers to 
Rabbi Eliezer, whose commentary on creation postulates creation by 
means of pre-existent matter. Maimonides depicts this commentary as 
admitting "the eternity of the world, if only as it is conceived according to 
Plato's opinion."68 Without rejecting either of these statements, 
Maimonides claims that their comments are "only the counterpart of the 
passage in which Rabbi Eliezer says, 'Wherefrom were the heavens creat-
ed./I'69 Inasmuch as Maimonides is not bothered by the implications of the 
latter, so too can it be inferred that he is not bothered by the former. In this 
way Maimonides has opened the interpretative door to subsequent Jewish 
philosophers who will use Rabbi Eliezer's words to support a theory of 
pre-existent matter. 
One such philosopher is Joseph Albo (d. 1444), who represents the intel-
lectual bridge between the medieval and modem philosophical world. The 
author of Sefer Ikkarim [Book of Principles], Albo incorporated Maimonides' 
discussion of pre-existent matter into his own examination of creation, 
which is couched in the context of developing a theory of time. He is one 
of the first Jewish philosophers to espouse the view that time is a phenom-
enon of the imagination, a motif introduced by Crescas and recurring in 
Spinoza. Alba's discussion of time occurs in the context of demonstrating 
that God is independent of time. For Albo, God's independence of time 
comprises both eternity (ha-kadmut) and perpetuity (ha-nitzhiyyut) and is 
upheld as a basic principle:70 
The third dogma is that God is independent of time. This means that 
God existed before time, and will exist after time ceases, therefore His 
power is infinite. For everyone who is dependent upon time is neces-
sarily limited in power, which ends with time. Since, therefore God 
is not dependent upon time, His power is infinite.71 
That God is prior to all existing things, including time, was a common-
place of Aristotelian thought. But inasmuch as this view was not held by 
his teacher Crescas, [who argued that time is independent of the physical 
world and had existed prior to it], so Albo must be ready to explain to 
Crescas' followers his own position vis a vis primordial time.72 By God's 
priority Albo means that nothing was prior to God, not even non-existence; 
God has always existed "in the same way without change."73 Similarly 
God's eternality means that nothing is posterior to God, not even time. For 
if time outlasted God either a parte ante or a parte post, then God would exist 
at one instant of time and not at another; this, of course, would undermine 
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God's necessary existence. 
These comments lead Albo to examine the nature of time and creation 
more closely. God's eternality holds, he claims, 
even if by time we mean unmeasured duration (hameshekh habilti 
meshoar) conceived only in thought, existing always, both before the 
creation of the world and after its cessation, but without the order 
apparent from the motion of the sphere, since the sphere was then 
neither in motion nor existent.74 
Only measured time cannot exist without motion. Time itself, according 
to Albo is not dependent upon motion and even preexisted the world. 
This non-Aristotelian motif is developed more fully. In another context 
Albo compares the commandments to time inasmuch as both time and 
commandments are not actual existents (bilti nimtzaim be'poal) : 
[just as] time is not an actual existent, for the past is no longer here, 
the future is not yet, and the present is merely the now which binds 
the past to the future. The now itself is not real time (zeman al derech 
ha-emet), since it is not divisible, whereas time is divisible, pertaining 
as it does to continuous quantity (hacamah hamitdabek). The now is 
related to time as the point is related to the line. Time is therefore not 
an actual existent, and yet it gives perfection of existence to all things 
existing in time?5 
Albo then distinguishes between "plain time" and "the order of time" as 
follows: 
Our Rabbis are of the opinion that time in the abstract (ha-zeman be-
shilluah) is such a duration. Time measured or numbered through 
the motion of the sphere they call "order of times" (seder zemanim), 
not simply time (zeman s'tam). According to this there are two species 
of time, the one is numbered and measured by the motion of the 
sphere, to which are applicable the terms prior and posterior, equal 
and unequal. The other is not numbered or measured but is a dura-
tion (hemshekh) existing prior to the sphere, to which the words equal 
and unequal do not apply. 76 
Whereas plain time is neither numbered nor measured, the order of 
times is numbered and measured by the motion of the diurnal sphere. In 
contrast to ordered time, plain time is eternal duration. Albo then raises 
two perplexities pertaining to time. The first puzzle is whether time origi-
nates in time or not. The solution is that although time has no origin and 
does not come to be in time, the "order of time" originates in time." The 
second puzzle concerns the instant: "The now (ha-'atah), it is said, divides 
the past from the future. There is therefore a time before the first now, and 
hence time and the sphere are eternal."7R Albo's answer, relying on his 
two-fold notion of time, is that Aristotle's argument refers only to the 
"order of times" and not to "plain time"; plain time in which there is no 
motion "has not the elements prior and posterior, and it is not subject to 
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measure because measure cannot apply to time without motion. The terms 
prior and posterior apply to it [plain time] only figuratively and loosely."79 
To Rabbi Judah ben Simon's related dictum that the order of time pre-exist-
ed creation, Albo is quick to point out that Rabbi Judah really meant that 
the time which is measured by the motion of the sphere is called "order of 
times" and is contrasted to time simply (hazeman be-shilluah) which has no 
priority, posteriority, or order.8o 
But Albo recognizes that ultimately this solution does not resolve the 
issue. Quoting the famous Rabbinic passage that one must not explore 
what is above, below, before and behind, Albo accedes that he has not real-
ly explained "how there can be a duration before the creation of the world 
which has in it neither prior nor posterior."B! Or as Harvey has succinctly 
argued, Albo has not succeeded in explaining how, within the "order of 
times", there can be a first instant which has no ''before.''82 
IV. Conclusion 
In his rich and comprehensive study "Time in Judaism," Steensgaard 
has stated that because medieval Jewish philosophy was primarily deriva-
tive, "it makes little sense to search for [the concept of time] among the 
Jewish philosophers of religion of the Middle Ages."i\3 Nothing, however, 
could be further from the truth. That medieval Jewish philosophers were 
influenced by speculative schools at critical points in their history has 
rarely, if ever, been contested by scholars. But to reject the ideas of Jewish 
philosophers as merely derivative and not worthy of study is to ignore the 
creativity which can arise out of cultural and philosophical influences. In 
contradistinction to Steensgaard, I have attempted in this paper to demon-
strate that medieval Jewish discussions of creation reflect a complexity 
which is nuanced by the subtle interweaving of biblical, Rabbinical and 
Greek philosophical traditions. 
This subtle interweaving has given rise to a sophisticated literature 
which focuses upon the very first instant of creation. Not surprisingly, 
early Jewish writings disagree over how best to interpret Genesis I. Some 
rabbis attest to the pre-existence of matter, time, and entire generations, 
while others insist that nothing pre-existed the creation of our world. 
These early Rabbinical writings are incorporated into medieval Jewish dis-
cussions of creation and time. By the twelfth century, I have suggested 
that Jewish philosophers are working with a conception of creation and 
time drawn clearly from Aristotelian sources. Questions of infinite divisi-
bility, omniscience, eternity, and temporal order abound. Saadiah Gaon 
reflects the Kalam preoccupation with traversal of an infinite series, a preoc-
cupation which can be traced back to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Saadiah 
uses the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite to demonstrate that 
the universe must have had a first temporal instant. 
We have seen that Maimonides is sympathetic to an Aristotelian theory 
of time. And yet much of his effort has been aimed at showing that the 
Scriptural view of creation is inconsistent with this theory. Maimonides is 
unwilling to support Aristotle's denial of creation altogether, however. His 
own view, then, is a version of eternal creation according to which an eter-
CREATION AND TEMPORALITY 473 
nally existing world has been sustained by a Creator, but not in a temporal 
context. In the sense that there is no one instant in which the world is 
brought into existence, it is eternal; in the sense, however, that God is the 
ontological ground of the world, it is created. Albo, on the other hand, 
introduces into Jewish thought the distinction between 'plain time' which 
is unmeasured, and 'order of time' which is measured by the motion of the 
celestial spheres. Hearkening back to Plotinus, Albo allows for the intro-
duction of an imaginary realm to time which is independent of physical 
motion of the diurnal spheres. 
Ultimately what is at stake for all these thinkers is how to reconcile dis-
parate models of creation and temporality. My initial suggestion was that 
accepting Aristotle's eternity thesis of the universe, represented in this con-
text by the infinity of time, required serious modifications on the part of 
theologically minded thinkers committed to a belief in an efficacious Deity. 
Unlike Saadiah Gaon who eschewed eternity altogether, both Maimonides 
and Albo introduce elements of eternity into their philosophical cosmolo-
gy. Unwilling to reject the possibility of infinite time, they have both incor-
porated the idea of pre-existent time into their cosmology. However, they 
have managed to maintain the efficacy of a creator Deity, thus retaining the 
creation paradigm presented in Scripture. Like the early Rabbis, they have 
demonstrated that the "gates of interpretation are never closed," that 
Scriptural texts and traditions can be deconstructed to accomodate compet-
ing philosophical models. Let me suggest in closing that Judaism's contri-
bution to philosophical theology ultimately lies in the the creativity of this 
interpretative process. 
The Ohio State University 
NOTES 
1. Cf. Andre Neher, "The View of Time and History in Jewish Culture," in 
Cultures and Time, ed. Louis Gardet et a1. (Paris: The Unesco Press, 1976),50: 
"The primordial element is 'time' itself. Creation was manifested in the 
appearance of time. This time is entirely new. That is the significance of the 
verb bara." 
2. For a discussion of the ways in which these rabbinic discussions influ-
ence subsequent Jewish philosophers, see Norbert Samuelson, Judaism and the 
Doctrine of Creation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 140ff. By 
the term 'early Rabbis' T mean to include primarily those Rabbis whose works 
were included in Genesis Rabbah, a collection of Tannaitic and Amoraitic com-
mentaries upon Genesis. Samuelson also discusses in this context individuals 
such as Ibn Ezra, Nahmanides and Sforno whose commentaries upon Genesis 
are included in the Miqraot Gedolot, which are the standard printed Rabbinic 
bibles. T shall not touch upon these latter thinkers in this brief study. 
3. For a survey of early Jewish views on this topic see Alexander 
Altmann, "A Note on the Rabbinic Doctrine of Creation," Journal of Jewish 
Studies 7 (1956), 195-206; Jonathan A. Goldstein, "The Origins of the Doctrine 
of Creation Ex Nihilo," Journal of Jewish Studies 35 (1984), 127-135. In this paper 
Goldstein tries to argue, against recent scholars, that early Jews and Christians 
in fact had a theory of creation ex nihilo which was tied to conceptions of bodily 
474 Faith and Philosophy 
resurrection. 
4. See Efraim Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. 1. 
Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 211 for discussion of these pas-
sages. 
5. Nedarim 39b. 
6. Genesis Rabbah 1.4. 
7. Shabbat 88b. 
8. Hagigah 14a. 
9. Rashi Commentary 
10. Genesis Rabbah 9:2. 
11. Hagigah 12a. 
12. Timaeus 370. 
13. Timaeus,37E. 
14. For a discussion of the issues and texts involved in this debate, d. 
Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London: Duckworth, 1983), 
272-275. 
15. Timaeus,38C. 
16. For a discussion of additional similarities between Genesis and Plato's 
Timaeus, d. Samuelson, op. cit., 194-197. 
17. Edward Grant, "Cosmology," in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David 
Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 266. 
18. In this paper, unless otherwise noted, Saadiah's text will based on the 
English translation of Alexander Altmann, The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, in 
Three Jewish Philosophers (New York: Atheneum Press, 1972). This edition con-
tains excellent footnotes. A complete English translation of the Arabic text 
Amanat wal-i'tiqadat can be found in The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. 
Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). 
19. See Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of 
God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987) for detailed comparison of Saadiah's arguments with those of John 
Philoponus. 
20. For a detailed discussion of the history and transmission of these texts, 
see Davidson, op. cit., 86ff; Sorabji, op. cit., 197ff. Some of Philoponus' relevant 
texts can be found in Philoponus: Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, 
trans. Christian Wildberg, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
21. For a history of this transmission see Davidson, op. cit., 86 -116. 
Davidson notes at least thirteen medieval discussions which draw upon 
Philoponus' position that infinity cannot be traversed. 
22. See texts in Sorabji, op. cit., 214-5. 
23. Wildberg, op. cit., 144. 
24. Wildberg, op. cit., 145. See Davidson, op. cit., 88. Philoponus expands 
this argument, claiming that " .. .if on the one hand the ascent (anodos) took 
place ad infinitum, complete things would not precede the incomplete, and the 
actual not the potential; but if on the other hand <the motions> are limited <in 
number>, then the first <motion> which evidently exists together with the uni-
verse, has made a beginning which starts from something actual and complete 
for the subsequent motions." Wildberg, op. cit., 145. 
25. Wildberg, op. cit., 146. 
26. Some scholars have taken the inability to provide demonstrative argu-
ment to lie at the heart of Maimonides' discussion of creation in The Guide of the 
Perplexed. See below, pp.12ff. 
27. Sorabji, op. cit., 177. 
28. The argument is presented in Saadiah Gaon, The Book of Doctrines and 
Beliefs, 56: "I know that time is threefold: past, present, and future. Although 
CREATION AND TEMPORALITY 475 
the present is shorter than any instant, I take the instant as one takes a point, 
and say: If a man should try in his thought to ascend from that point in time 
to the uppermost points, it would be impossible for him to do so, inasmuch as 
time is now assumed to be infinite and it is impossible for thought to penetrate 
to the furthest point of that which is infinite ... The same reason will also make 
it impossible that the process of generation should traverse an infinite period 
down to the lowest point so as ultimately to reach us. Yet if the process of gen-
eration did not reach us, we would not be generated, from which it necessarily 
follows that we, the multitude of generated beings, would not be generated 
and the beings now existent would not be existent. And since I find myself 
existent, I know that the process of generation has traversed time until it has 
reached us, and that if time were not finite, the process of generation would 
not have traversed it." 
29. The original source for Zeno's paradoxes of motion is Aristotle, Physics 
6.9. For a history of the transmission of these paradoxes, d. Sorabji, op. cit. 
30. Saadiah Gaon, The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, 57. "It has come to my 
notice that a certain heretic in conversation with one of the Believers in the 
Unity of God, objected to this proof. He said 'It is possible for a man to tra-
verse by walking that which has an infinite number of parts. For if we consid-
er any distance which a man walks, be it a mile, or an ell, we should find that it 
can be divided into an infinite number of parts." 
31. Maimonides describes Nazzam's theory of the leap in greater detail in 
Guide I.73 prop 3. See also the discussion in Sorabji, op. cit., 385ff. 
32. Sorabji, op. cit., 388. 
33. Cf. Aristotle, Physics 3.6 206a 16-18ff; 263b 2-8. 
34. Davidson has pointed to the similarity between Saadiah's formulation 
and al-Kindi's formulation of the same argument. In response to the challenge 
posed by assuming (3.4), AI-Kindi tries to show that it is not possible for "time 
to have infinity in actuality, either in the past or future." In AI-Kindi's argu-
ment, time is construed as a continuum capable of both infinite addition and 
division. Assuming that the infinite cannot be traversed, however, AI-Kindi 
simply rejects the possibility of (3.4) altogether on the grounds that "since there 
is a definite time (the present) all time must be finite." In this way he rejects 
the Aristotelian distinction between actual and potential infinity as applied to 
time. Cf. Alfred Ivry, AI-Kindi's Ml'taphysics (Albany, NY SUNY Press, 1974), 
74. "Before every temporal segment there is (another) segment, until we reach 
a temporal segment before which there is no segment, i.e. a segmented dura-
tion before which there is no segmented duration. It cannot be otherwise - if 
it were possible, and after every segment of time there was a segment, infinite-
ly, then we would never reach a given time - for the duration from past infin-
ity to this given time would be equal to the duration from this given time 
regressing in times to infinity; and if (the duration) from infinity to a definite 
time was known, then (the duration) from this known time to temporal infinity 
would be known, and then the infinite is finite, and this is an impossible con-
tradiction." Al-Kindi's argument then continues as follows: "Furthermore, if a 
definite time cannot be reached until a time before it is reached, nor that before 
it until a time before it is reached, and so to infinity; and the infinite can neither 
be traversed nor brought to an end; then the temporally infinite can never be 
traversed so as to reach a definite time. However its termination at a definite 
time exists, and time is not an infinite segment, but rather is finite necessarily, 
and therefore the duration of body is not infinite, and it is not possible for body 
to be without duration. Thus the being of a body does not have infinity; the 
being of a body is, rather, finite, and it is impossible for body to be eternal." 
35. Saadiah Gaon, The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, 57. Altmann notes that 
476 Faith and Philosophy 
the term imagination (wahm; mahshavah) is sometimes used by the Arabic 
philosophers in the sense of 'potentially'. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ivry points out that this acceptance of the ontological legitimacy of 
potential existence enables Aristotle to consider the universe as eternal, though 
in actuality we perceive only finite time, movements and magnitude. Ivry,op. 
cit.,151. See Physics III:6 206a 16ff; 7 207b 2. 
38. In contradistinction, Maimonides would view Saadiah and AI-Kindi's 
refutations of infinity as spurious on the grounds they are too restrictive with 
respect to potential infinity. See further discussion of this point in Ivry, op. cit., 
153. 
39. Davidson, op. cit., 96. 
40. Davidson, op. cit., 97. 
41. Davidson, op. cit., 97. 
42. Unless otherwise noted, page references to the Guide will be to 
Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, ed. and trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963). 
43. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: The Book of Knowledge, trans. Moses 
Hyamson (Jerusalem, 1962). 
44. For the details of this cosmology, d. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 37a-
38a. 
45. Cf. Metaphysics 7.7. 
46. See De Caelo 1.9 279a 8 ff. A similar point is propounded in Physics 
IV.l2. 
47. Ptolemy, however, recognized that Aristotle could not account for vari-
ations in the observed distances of the planets. He therefore introduced eccen-
tric and epicyclic circles to account for planetary motions. Medieval philoso-
phers were faced, therefore, with a dilemma: they could either reject the earth's 
centrality and abandon a vital part of Aristotelian physics, or they could accept 
a cosmology that was untenable from the perspective of the astronomers. 
Grant goes on to describe a third alternative as well, namely one in which 
additional orbs are introduced according to which the variation in planetary 
distances was incorporated into a system of concentric planetary spheres. In 
this way both Aristotelian and Ptolemaic systems are salvaged. For a brief 
introduction to the vast secondary literature dealing with this issue, d. Grant, 
op. cit., 280ff; Pierre Duhem, Medieval Cosmology, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
48. Guide lU9, 308. See also the comment in II.24 to the effect that in 
Aristotle's time "mathematics had not been brought to perfection." 
49. Guide 11.24, 322. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., 322-3. 
52. In his article "The True Perplexity: The Guide of the Perplexed Part II, ch 
24," in Perspectives on Maimonides, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), Y. Tzvi Langermann points out that it is not at all clear 
whether Maimonides himself subscribes to all these arguments. 
53. Guide 11.24, 326-7. 
54. Surely that is one of the bases of Langermann's article "The True 
Perplexity." The intriguing question, of course, is whether Maimonides 
thought that all the issues in the Guide could ultimately be traced back to this 
basic perplexity. 
55. The original text is found in Guide 11.24, 326-7. 
56. Menachem Kellner, "On the Status of the Astronomy and Physics in 
Maimonides' Mishneh Torah and Guide of the Perplexed: a Chapter in the History 
CREATION AND TEMPORALITY 477 
of Science," British Journal for the History of Science 24 (1991),454. 
57. Kellner, op. cit., 461. 
58. Langermann, op. cit., 165. 
59. On Langermann's reading, Maimonides is alluding to our inability to 
understand the nature of the fifth element of which the heavens are formed, 
and not to the actual physical configuration of the heavens as a whole. 
60. Cf. Guide 11.24. 
61. T.M. Rudavsky, "Creation and Time in Maimonides and Gersonides," 
in God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium, ed. David Burrell and Bernard 
McGinn (Notre Dame, Ind: Univ. Notre Dame Press, 1990), 122-146. 
62. Guide II.13, 282. 
63. Ibid. 
64. See Sarah Klein-Braslavy, Milimonides' Interpretation of the Story of 
Creation (Heb) Qerusalem: Israel Society for Biblical Research, 1987), 115. 
65. For further elaboration of this point, see Klein-Braslavy, op. cit., 81-2, 86-7. 
66. Guide 11.30, 349. 
67. Guide II.30, 349. 
68. Guide 11.26, 331. 
69. Guide II.30, 349. 
70. Joseph Albo, Sefer Ikkarim (Book of Principles), ed. and trans. Isaac Husik 
(Philadelphia: 1946),1. 130. 
71. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II. 108-9. 
72. For a discussion of Albo's sources, d. Warren Zev Harvey, "Alba's 
Discussion of Time," The Jewish Quarterly Review, 71 (1981), 213. In what fol-
lows, I am very much indebted to Harvey's article. 
73. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 109. 
74. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 110. 
75. Albo, Sefer Tkkarim, III, 259. 
76. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, 11,110-111. 
77. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 111. 
78. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 111. 
79. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 111-112. 
80. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 113. 
81. Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, II, 112. 
82. Harvey, op. cit., 223. 
83. In his richly evocative and informative article "Time in Judaism," in 
Religion and Time, ed. A. N. Balslev and IN. Mohanty (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 
63-108, Paul Steensgaard spends a scant two pages on the medieval Jewish 
philosophical tradition. 
